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The impetus for this book arose from observing several intriguing changes 
in the contemporary philosophical landscape. We are witnessing a grow-
ing engagement in empirically informed philosophy of mind, which offers fer-
tile interfaces between philosophy and cognitive science, allowing for the 
application of philosophical resources to the subject matter of scientific 
inquiries and their calibration in light of empirical findings. Moreover, a 
considerable amount of the philosophical work in this book was propelled 
by two distinct shifts within empirically informed philosophy of mind, 
which invite philosophical engagement with the theoretical commitments 
of emerging conceptual frameworks and research programs.
The first shift can be described in terms of an intensified study of the 
embodied mind. The theoretical basis of cognitive science no longer exclu-
sively relies on cognitivist approaches that comprehend mental processes as 
abstract formal processes or as activation patterns in neural networks that 
can be adequately described in abstraction from the body and the environ-
ment. In contrast, embodied accounts subscribe to the idea that cognition 
often is best comprehended as the artifact of a dense interaction between 
neural and non-neural entities and processes. This is explanatorily rele-
vant and exerts a profound influence on cognition in a way that stretches 
far beyond providing input into a cognitive system it remains closed 
off from.
The second shift can be described in terms of an intensified study of 
the disordered mind, expressing an acknowledgment of the convergence of 
the explanatory concerns of psychiatry and interdisciplinary inquiries in the 
mind. An empirically informed reflection about psychopathological phe-
nomena constitutes a valuable resource for testing theories, offering real- life 
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cases instead of the hypothetical ones that feature in philosophical thought 
experiments. Experimental manipulations in controlled environments can 
be fruitfully combined with studying “naturally” occurring changes in indi-
viduals with mental disorders in ecologically valid environments.
Combining these two shifts offers the possibility of complementing con-
tributions and distinctive insights into cognitive processes, as well as the 
exploration of potential benefits for the understanding and treatment of 
mental disorders. A more complete understanding of our cognitive lives 
requires considering their dependence upon features of the (non- neural) 
body and environment and their vulnerability to malfunction. Moreover, 
if it is true that cognition is “embodied” in a nontrivial sense, then we 
may anticipate that increased attention to the body will yield epistemo-
logical gains in understanding how the mind works and harbor potential 
implications for the diagnosis and treatment of mental disturbances and 
disorders.
The overall aim of this book is to help create synergy at the intersection 
of embodiment and psychopathology. The book will motivate and defend 
the actively scaffolded cognition (ASC) framework, which restructures and 
repositions embodied approaches to promote a direct interdisciplinary dia-
logue among philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science. It will offer a 
taxonomy of ways in which cognition is scaffolded onto the body and the 
environment, and it will demonstrate that ASC can offer useful resources 
for comprehending prominent features of mental disorders and for provid-
ing new ideas for therapeutic measures.
I have benefited enormously from the writings of Tony Chemero, 
Andy Clark, Shaun Gallagher, Susan Hurley, Dan Hutto, Mark Johnson, 
Richard Menary, Mark Rowlands, John Sutton, Kim Sterelny, and Mike 
Wheeler, all of whom have established productive dialogues between the 
empirical sciences of the mind and philosophical inquiry. I am grateful 
to Philip Laughlin, senior editor at MIT, and series editors Jennifer Rad-
den and Jeff Poland for support and encouragement from the start and 
for putting up with the delayed completion of this book. The construc-
tive comments of four anonymous reviewers helped me to improve the 
manuscript. I have benefited greatly as well from continuous conver-
sations with Remy Debes, Shaun Gallagher, David M. Gray, Thor Grün-
baum, Detlef Heck, Dan Hutto, Beate Krickel, Albert Newen, Jennifer 
Radden, Heidi Samuelson, John Tienson, Deborah Tollefsen, and Michael 
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Wheeler, whose thoughtful comments and questions helped increase 
the lucidity and precision of some of the main arguments put forward in 
the book. Of course, these colleagues and friends bear no responsibility 
for the theses developed and defended in this book; any remaining errors 
are my own. Heidi Samuelson’s outstanding copyediting considerably ame-
liorated the text, sparing the reader from chewing through passages overly 
inspired by various arrangements of non- English sentence structures.
The completion of the research for this project was made possible by a 
professional development assignment and a faculty research grant, both 
awarded by the University of Memphis. Furthermore, I’ve also benefited 
from support as a visiting research fellow at the Center for Mind, Brain 
and Cognitive Evolution at Ruhr Universität Bochum and as an affiliate 
faculty member of the Institute of Intelligent Systems at the University of 
Memphis.
Some of the material in the book draws on published journal articles. 
Thanks to the publishers for the permission to use material from the fol-
lowing pieces: “Embodied Concepts and Disordered Minds,” Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 43 (2) (2018): 241– 260; “Demarcating the Realm of 
Cognition,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 49 (3) (2017): 435– 450; 
“Interaction and Extended Cognition,” Synthese 193 (8) (2016): 2469– 2496; 
“Cognition, Representations and Embodied Emotions: Investigating Cogni-
tive Theory,” Erkenntnis 79 (1) (2014): 165– 190.

1.1 Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind
Intensified interaction with the empirical sciences has led to numerous 
transformations in philosophical work. The traditional way of conceiving 
the task of philosophy is tied to a large extent to the method of conceptual 
analysis, which is applied to several central concepts in various fields of 
inquiry. For example, some philosophers of mind think that the chief task is 
to provide a fine- grained, purely a priori analysis of, say, folk- psychological 
concepts like belief and desire. In this view, philosophical analysis is not 
answerable to empirical facts, and the results of the inquiry are mainly 
attained based on mapping connections within the conceptual scheme 
that constitutes the medium of thinking. Mapping the relevant relations 
may include designing particular thought experiments, which shed light 
on the tacit meaning of concepts under investigation and unearth implicit 
principles that can help clarify conflicting judgments. But overall, this view 
depicts philosophy as essentially being in the business of descriptive con-
ceptual analysis, aiming, as P. F. Strawson (1992, 7) puts it, to “produce a 
systematic account of the general conceptual structure of which our daily 
practice shows us to have a tacit and unconscious mastery.”
In the contemporary philosophical landscape, such a view of the tasks 
and methods of philosophical inquiry is becoming much less common, 
and major scientific fields of inquiry are now complemented by subdivi-
sions of philosophy that specialize in investigating a range of questions 
pertinent to the subject matter. The success of cognitive science has surely 
been a motivating factor for philosophers to account for new findings and 
to adjust their theories, topics, and approaches. Philosophers investigating 
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the mind now often draw on findings in the sciences of the mind, reach-
ing conclusions based on empirically informed reflection instead of a priori 
methods. Accompanying this reorientation in philosophical theory con-
struction, it is now relatively customary to comprehend armchair “data” as 
defeasible and to deploy a “wide” reflective equilibrium methodology (e.g., 
Graham and Horgan 1994). This does not necessarily require a complete 
break with traditional methods of armchair analysis, but it definitively 
involves a decisive impulse toward “naturalization,” reducing the “cogni-
tive wiggle room” by recourse to empirical research (Weinberg 2017). With-
out this empirical input, especially in areas in the philosophy of mind, the 
view is that armchair approaches risk “losing contact with the very phe-
nomena they seek to illuminate” (Kornblith 2017, 159).
These roughly delineated modifications in philosophical thinking have 
contributed to the emergence of a dynamically evolving specialized field, 
which encompasses a number of productive interfaces between philosophy 
and cognitive science. Of course, philosophy may not seem to be mani-
festly present in the everyday practice of cognitive science. Nonetheless, 
empirically informed philosophy of mind fits naturally into an interdisci-
plinary field with a multitude of methodological approaches that has, since 
its beginnings, regarded philosophy as one of its participating disciplines. 
In fact, some argue that due to the nature and subject matter of cognitive 
science, there is “no impassable gulf between those cognitive scientists who 
are philosophers and those who belong in the other disciplines, and there is 
no sharp line between the issues proper to the respective areas” (van Gelder 
1998b, 134; Grush 2002).1
However, although there are no sharp divisions, philosophers have a 
particular role to play, and the nature of their work— for instance, evaluat-
ing the virtues of competing theories and determining their underlying 
commitments— is distinct, neither clearly conceptual nor empirical (Thom-
asson 2014). Sorting out the details of this type of philosophical work is 
beyond the aims of this book, but we may say that it engages empirical 
material, clarifies concepts, interprets tested and untested hypotheses, and 
forms new hypotheses, some of which can be tested. The approach lends 
itself to addressing themes that do not (yet) lend themselves to a trans-
formation into scientifically tractable questions and that have not (yet) 
reached a level of maturation at which they could be confirmed or refuted 
(van Gelder 1998b).2 In this sense, cognitive science is, as Daniel C. Dennett 
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puts it, “a land of plenty for philosophers,” because many of its questions 
“are still ill thought out, prematurely precipitated into forms that deserve 
critical reevaluation. If philosophy is, as my bumper sticker slogan has it, 
what you’re doing until you figure out just what questions to ask, then 
there is a lot of philosophy to be done by cognitive scientists these days” 
(Dennett 2009, 232).
Moreover, this approach exhibits three important characteristics that 
are of central importance for the aims of this book. First, such empirically 
informed philosophy avoids the pitfalls of (cognitive) scientism (philoso-
phers generate questions but should leave the answers to “proper” cogni-
tive scientists) and isolationism (cognitive science has nothing to offer to 
philosophical analyses of conceptual schemes; for a discussion, see, e.g., 
Davies 2005; Ludwig 2015). Second, it is an interactive specialized subdivi-
sion, in the sense that its investigations create an interface that allows for 
combining the application of philosophical resources to the subject matter 
of scientific inquiries with the calibration of philosophical approaches in 
light of empirical findings and scientific accounts. Third, it is naturalistic 
in the sense that philosophical investigations are understood as continu-
ous with empirical work in relevant fields. Unlike traditional approaches, 
empirically informed philosophy of mind holds that metaphysics should 
be informed by and be continuous with science.
1.2 Philosophy in Cognitive Science
Another way to help clarify the approach of this book is to explore how it 
corresponds (and fails to correspond) to extant distinctions in the litera-
ture. To distinguish empirically informed philosophy of mind from other 
philosophical work, some differentiate between philosophy of cognitive 
science and philosophy in cognitive science (e.g., Brook 2009). Empiri-
cally informed philosophy of mind is a way of doing philosophy in cogni-
tive science— for instance, by offering integrative interpretations of tested 
hypotheses into larger frameworks, generating new hypotheses, and pro-
viding fine- grained conceptual clarifications. Philosophical work of this 
kind can be seen as philosophy in cognitive science because it constitutes 
a part of the practice of cognitive science, whether or not it is performed 
by researchers trained in philosophical methods. In contrast, philosophy 
of cognitive science can be pursued in several ways. For instance, it can 
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be pursued by using the tools of philosophy of science, working out how 
general problems in the epistemology and metaphysics of scientific inquiry 
manifest themselves in cognitive science (Bechtel 2009, 2010; Bechtel and 
Herschbach 2010). Systematic considerations of the nature of explanation, 
confirmation, validity, the relation between theory and data, reduction, 
and so on in the special case of cognitive science are indispensable for 
securing scientific progress, especially in light of the different fundamental 
methodological and conceptual commitments of various disciplines com-
prising cognitive science (Samuels, Margolis, and Stich 2012).3
Although the type of empirically informed philosophy of mind that this 
book engages in can be understood largely as philosophy in cognitive sci-
ence, it also involves significant amounts of reflection that may be more 
characteristic of philosophy of cognitive science. For example, investigating 
whether cognitive models fit behavioral data or whether certain correla-
tions perhaps reflect causal or constitutive relations involves deliberation 
about the types of explanations that one takes to be suitable for cognitive 
processes. Moreover, offering a theoretical framework that aims to integrate 
various positions with emerging empirical findings involves reflection on 
the extent to which a single, unified view is possible, especially in light of 
the considerable complexity of mind and behavior.
1.3 Two Shifts
Having briefly delineated the nature of the empirically informed philoso-
phy of mind that this book employs, it is important to note that the overall 
project is propelled by major theoretical reorientations in the field. This 
is the type of situation in which philosophical work is especially called 
upon to advance research by engaging often ambiguous theoretical com-
mitments of emerging conceptual frameworks and research programs. 
This book brings together what can be seen as two shifts in the empirically 
informed study of the mind.
1.3.1 The Embodied Mind
The first shift is in the theoretical basis of cognitive science toward the 
embodied mind. Some maintain that we are witnessing a paradigm shift 
toward embodied cognition (EC), undermining the central idea of cognitiv-
ism, according to which “cognitive mental processes are operations defined 
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on syntactically structured mental representations that are much like sen-
tences” (Fodor 2000, 3– 4). Of course, one may point out that somewhat 
similar shifts have occurred previously— such as during the 1980s, when 
emphasis progressively shifted from abstract formal descriptions of cogni-
tive processes to connectionist approaches based on neural models of cogni-
tive architecture and neural- based computation (Bermúdez 2014, 59– 82).4 
However, though this shift has certainly introduced significant theoretical 
modifications, it left certain fundamental commitments untouched. One 
of these is a basic understanding of the mind that underlies cognitivism’s 
methodological approach. Although the organism’s body and sensorimo-
tor systems deliver sensory input and enable behavioral output, the view is 
that they do not shape cognitive processing in any interesting and episte-
mologically significant way. This means that whether mental processes are 
best seen as abstract formal processes or as activation patterns in neural net-
works, the shared commitment is that they unfold inside brains and can be 
adequately explained in abstraction from the body and the environment.
In contrast, EC aims to provide an approach that accentuates the func-
tion of the body and the environment in cognition. EC accounts converge 
on some version of the general view that cognition is the product of the 
dynamic interaction of neural and non- neural processes. Without there 
being essential gaps between cognition, body, and environmental fea-
tures, the idea is that numerous aspects of an agent’s cognition profoundly 
depend upon features of that agent’s non- neural body and environment. 
Before going further, it is worth pausing to specify the sense in which depen-
dence is understood.
First, though logical dependence obtains between propositions, we are 
in this context concerned with ontological dependence, which describes a 
variety of relationships between entities or beings. Still, the sentence “cog-
nition ontologically depends on the body” can be comprehended in several 
ways. Understood in a strict sense of ontological dependence, cognition 
could not exist if the body did not exist or did not supply its machinery 
with oxygen. Existential dependence in this strict sense is a relatively triv-
ial relation that has little explanatory power in our context. Much more 
relevant for the purposes of this book is a different sense of dependence 
that we could call nature dependence. In this relation of dependence, cog-
nition depends on the body not merely for its existence, but also for its 
nature or character. Saying that X (cognition) depends on Y (the body or 
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environment) is in this sense roughly equivalent to saying that X is gener-
ally shaped by the specifics of Y or that aspects of X reflect aspects of Y. This 
relationship is important from an explanatory standpoint: when the nature 
or character of X is dependent on Y in this sense, then the characteristics of 
Y cannot be ignored in the explanation of X.
EC is best seen as a conceptual umbrella for several relatively un- unified 
research endeavors that have nevertheless influenced theory and practice 
in cognitive science. EC comprises labels like embodied, embedded, extended, 
and enacted cognition, which all endorse epistemological inseparability and 
thus the view that the organism’s body and sensorimotor systems actively 
participate in the execution of cognition, such that we cannot provide a 
full understanding of cognitive processes by studying exclusively what is 
occurring inside the head of the cognizer.
1.3.2 The Disordered Mind
The second shift is toward more sustained study of the disordered mind. The 
vulnerability of our minds to division and self- alienation has long capti-
vated philosophers, but the intense and puzzling perceptional, cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral characteristics in mental disorders are now 
receiving a more prominent emphasis. Within the last three decades, the 
new interdisciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry and cognitive 
psychopathology has begun to develop and flourish (Fulford 2000; Fulford 
et al. 2003; Graham 2009).5 Inspired by both Anglo- American analytic and 
continental philosophical traditions, philosophers, psychologists, and psy-
chiatrists working in this area are striving to attain a more profound under-
standing of both psychiatric conditions and mental healthcare. 
Within the philosophy of psychiatry, we may distinguish between over-
lapping areas of special interest (Graham and Stephens 1994; Murphy 
2008), employing the distinction between philosophy in and of psycho-
pathology. The latter includes fields of inquiry that deal with the way in 
which general problems in the philosophy of science related to explanation 
and classification manifest themselves in psychiatry as a special science. It 
also includes systematic reflections on how ethical considerations about 
rationality and self- determination apply to mental disorders. The former is 
progressively recognized to complement philosophy in cognitive science. 
For instance, philosophical reflections on questions surrounding personal 
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identity have profited from analyses of mental disorders (K. V. Wilkes 1988; 
Humphrey and Dennett 1989).
Compatibly with this second shift, there is an increasing acknowledg-
ment of the remarkable convergence of the concerns and approaches of 
cognitive science, psychiatry, and philosophical inquiries into the mind 
(see Cratsley and Samuels 2013). Psychiatrists have become increasingly 
attentive to the explanatory potential of cognitive science, perhaps assisted 
by the perceived lack of progress in the neurobiology and genetics of mental 
disorders (Bortolotti and Broome 2009; Kendler 2008; Kendler, Zachar, and 
Craver 2011), while cognitive scientists have gradually turned to explor-
ing features of psychopathology, hoping to shed light on puzzling phe-
nomena and to gain deeper insight into “normal” functioning. The view is 
that aspects of conditions classified as mental disorders can— not entirely 
unlike manipulations in experimental settings— provide opportunities to 
discern the nature of the mechanisms that underlie normal cognitive func-
tioning. The study of the disordered mind thus supplements philosophy 
in cognitive science with empirically informed theorizing about psycho-
pathological phenomena, which constitute valuable resources. Case stud-
ies from psychopathology offer important data that supports or challenges 
theories. In fact, the uniqueness of psychopathological aspects resembles 
actual instances of the sorts of imaginary conditions that appear in thought 
experiments, without raising concerns about plausibility.
1.4 A Productive Intersection
Although these two shifts in the empirically informed study of the mind 
may not be equally important and prevalent, they can complement each 
other in a number of ways.6 Importantly, the intersection offers the pos-
sibility of distinctive insight. For instance, psychopathology offers a rich 
source of insight about the organizational, structural, and functional fea-
tures of cognition and provides evidence relevant to the assessment of 
hypotheses. Experimental manipulations in controlled environments 
deployed to unearth these structures can be fruitfully combined with study-
ing “naturally” occurring changes in individuals with mental disorders in 
ecologically valid environments. Models of cognition can be evaluated by 
exploring the extent to which they are able to explain cognitive perfor-
mance in individuals with mental disorders and to offer viable explanations 
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of the nature of the impairment. The study of psychopathology allows for 
observing arrangements of functional continuation and disruption in cog-
nitive capacities, which enable inferences about the organization of normal 
functioning.
For instance, consider empathy, globally defined as the ability to under-
stand and respond to others’ mental states. Impairments in the capacity 
for empathy constitute a crucial dimension of several disorders. Studies 
on autism spectrum disorder (ASD), borderline personality disorder, and 
schizophrenia demonstrate that empathy is a mechanism that can be 
differentially impaired without, for instance, other damage in short- or 
long- term memory, showing that they function independently of each 
other. Once identified, this single dissociation can be used in epistemically 
constructive ways. For example, the existence of this single dissociation 
can lend initial support to the suggestion that empathy is not a unitary 
concept, but rather a multidimensional construct involving two distinct 
abilities: an emotional component and a cognitive component. In both 
ASD and borderline personality disorder, affective and cognitive empathy 
can be differentially impaired, such that a deficit in cognitive empathy 
is accompanied by a preserved emotional empathy (Smith 2009; Harari 
et al. 2010).
However, studies on alcoholism, controlled for psychiatric comorbidi-
ties, find the opposite pattern: impaired emotional empathy is accompa-
nied by preserved cognitive empathy (Maurage et al. 2011). Taken together, 
the findings show a double dissociation, supporting the idea that emotional 
and cognitive empathy are two distinct abilities, likely reflecting two dif-
ferent underlying mechanisms. The now differentiated intact and impaired 
functions help generate a taxonomy of functional subsystems and offer 
information about the functional organization of the human mind, though 
without showing how these subsystems interact. The bottom line is that 
the experimental investigation of pathological dissociations opens new 
stimulating ways for the scientific investigation of cognition.
To the philosophical study of the mind and psychopathology, EC also 
offers some of the aspects that traditional cognitive science lacks with 
respect to crucial aspects of mental disorders. It has been argued that tradi-
tional cognitive science neglects the role of emotions, the body, and phe-
nomenal consciousness. Take, for instance, three characteristic features of 
depression: motor retardation (e.g., slowed movements and speech, altered 
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bodily awareness), emotional disturbances (e.g., low mood), and altered 
phenomenal quality (e.g., the sense of being captured in an unchangeable 
state), which are often portrayed in clinical and autobiographical descrip-
tions (Ratcliffe 2008; Radden and Varga 2013). Of course, it is not the case 
that approaches that draw on the theoretical framework of traditional cog-
nitive science deny that these disturbances are characteristic. The point is 
that they regard them as secondary to, and to a large extent caused by, 
cognitive biases in depression. This approach provides a potential target for 
cognitive intervention, but it comes at a relatively steep price. It is unable 
to account for the rich phenomenology of experience in depression and 
fails to suitably explain why pathologically altered states in depression are 
experienced as absolutely resistant to change and detached from the men-
tal lives of others. This is where approaches that draw on EC could offer sig-
nificant contributions to understanding mental disorders, analyzing them 
not merely as “brain dysfunctions” but as disturbances of an immersed 
embodied interaction with the environment, mediated by the brain.
1.5 Scaffolded Minds and Actively Scaffolded Cognition
The book can be described as combining two epistemological assumptions 
that arise from these two shifts. The first assumption is connected to the 
embodied nature of human minds, whereas the second assumption is con-
nected to their fragile nature. This leads to the epistemological conjecture that 
though many psychological mechanisms are puzzling and unknown, we 
cannot provide a full understanding of cognition without studying (a) how 
cognition depends upon aspects of the non- neural body and environment 
and (b) how it is vulnerable to malfunction. The combination of these 
two assumptions leads to a fertile intersection with noteworthy epistemic 
potentials for philosophical research and clinical practice.
In light of the potential synergies and complementing contributions 
these two shifts offer, this book will investigate how they can be brought to 
work together and to explore potential benefits for the understanding and 
treatment of mental disorders. For this aim, the book will offer a theoretical 
framework, actively scaffolded cognition (ASC), which integrates a number of 
embodied approaches. The term scaffolding is beneficial for the aims of this 
book, as it offers a suitable amount of conceptual flexibility required for 
the task. The notion of cognitive scaffolding, originally advanced by Lev 
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Vygotsky and further developed by Kim Sterelny and others, became influ-
ential in developmental psychology, broadly designating support structures 
that enable a child to complete cognitive tasks that she could not accom-
plish on her own. But while scaffoldings in this tradition are seen often 
as temporary outside aids that are eventually removed once the child can 
perform a given task independently, the way the term is used in this book 
captures that they often become more or less permanent reinforcements of 
our cognitive machinery. In this way, the term will offer flexibility on sev-
eral levels, which will help taxonomize forms of scaffolding and outline a 
view that is able to understand various embodied approaches as continuous 
with the idea of “cognitive niche construction” (e.g., Sterelny 2010).
This conceptual flexibility will assist in integrating accounts that sub-
scribe to the principle of epistemological inseparability and that propel the 
study of mental disorders. ASC will offer a taxonomy of active scaffoldings, 
comprising two forms of intrasomatic scaffolding (simple and complex) and 
a specific form of extrasomatic scaffolding. The taxonomy is largely guided 
by pragmatic considerations linked to the explanation of common symp-
toms in mental disorders.
1.6 The Structure of the Book
Consistent with the principles of empirically informed philosophy of 
mind, this book aims to complete a dual task: mapping and application/
calibration. Consequently, it naturally falls into two parts. The first part 
(mapping) makes a distinctive theoretical contribution, whereas the sec-
ond part (application/calibration) shows how fine- grained philosophical 
distinctions can be applied to and calibrated by empirical research in psy-
chopathology. Not only does this type of dual task naturally arise at the 
intersection of cognitive science, philosophy, and psychopathology, but 
contributions of this kind are crucial for an interdisciplinary field like cog-
nitive science because they help address issues that traverse multiple areas 
of inquiry and link diverse approaches to understanding the mind.
The first task (chapters 2– 5) is to engage the theoretical commitments of 
EC and offer a platform for further investigation. This is an important step 
given that EC is not a unified area of research, and the various research proj-
ects usually subsumed under the EC label lack homogeneity and established 
definitions of central concepts (see, e.g., Wilson 2002). One major goal is 
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to draw the contours of ASC. For this, chapter 2 will explore two main 
theses that traditional cognitivism embraces but EC rejects. This chapter 
will provide an overview, which will gloss over details of particular posi-
tions to draw broad contours that only become noticeable at a particular 
level of abstraction. It will describe the cognitivist paradigm in terms of the 
commitments of three partially competing approaches (classicism, connec-
tionism, and mixed architecture), which share a commitment to particular 
internal procedures that process information from the environment to per-
form actions. Although these approaches also exhibit differences when it 
comes to questions about representations and cognitive architecture, they 
share a commitment to the two principles of the separability thesis, which 
define the “disembodied” picture that EC opposes. In addition, the chapter 
will discuss clinical cognitivism, which applies principles of cognitivism to 
a clinical and therapeutic context. Cognitivism is a relatively unified inter-
disciplinary approach that aims to comprehend the causal processes that 
execute computational operations on representational structures, but EC 
lacks the characteristics of a well- defined and unified theoretical approach. 
At least at this stage of its development, EC offers valuable corrections to 
the cognitivist approach to cognitive science, but it should probably not 
(yet) be seen as offering a full alternative to cognitivism.
With this background in place, chapter 3 will disentangle differing 
positions in current debates and introduce a number of fine- grained dis-
tinctions. The chapter will illustrate how the notion of ASC can be used 
to construct a framework that integrates a medley of positions that sup-
port at least one of the two claims of inseparability. The chapter will steer 
clear of some of the debates about the extent to which mind and world 
are intertwined and focus instead on offering a preliminary idea of what 
it means for cognition to be scaffolded onto the environment and senso-
rimotor processes. To exclude trivial forms of dependence, the notions of 
nature- dependence and active scaffolding will be introduced; additional 
details of ASC and its commitments will be further specified in chapters 
4 and 5.
The flexibility of the concept of scaffolding at this stage will help to 
tailor a taxonomy of forms of scaffolding, which is guided by pragmatic 
considerations regarding common symptoms in mental disorders and will 
therefore neither offer a comprehensive ontology nor focus on a particular 
cognitive domain or function. With the aim to provide distinctions that 
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could be productively applied to the context of psychopathology, the chap-
ter will distinguish between two forms of intrasomatic scaffolding (simple 
and complex) and a specific form of extrasomatic scaffolding (interso-
matic), which is a distinct kind of socially scaffolded cognition. Intra- and 
extrasomatic scaffolding thus are the classes of the ASC genus.
The taxonomy raises several weighty questions about the relationship of 
dependence that holds between the scaffold and what is scaffolded. Chap-
ters 4 and 5 will confront questions concerning inseparability in the onto-
logical sense, while also providing further specifications of other aspects of 
ASC. They will explore two different paths. Chapter 4 will draw on recent 
debates on the boundaries of cognition, while chapter 5 will address the 
issue in light of more general questions on how to delineate the boundar-
ies of mainly biological systems and mechanisms. To further specify ASC 
and its underlying “global” commitments, chapter 4 will position ASC in 
broader discussions about the boundaries of cognition in the philosophy 
of cognitive science, which is intertwined with the question of ontolog-
ical inseparability. This is a debate between cognitivism and EC, as well 
as between EC accounts, and numerous philosophers maintain that the 
discussion would greatly benefit from providing a “mark of the cogni-
tive” that picks out all and exclusively cognitive processes. The chapter 
will first engage two accounts that distinguish cognitive processing from 
mere information processing. This is followed by an investigation of the 
more general, fine- grained versus coarse- grained debate about the question 
of the correct grain level that should be deployed to examine cognitive 
processes. Roughly put, the debate revolves around this question: Should 
the boundary of the cognitive be fixed by examining the fine- grained 
functional details of cognition, or should the focus be on larger cognitive 
ensembles?
Although it has been noted that the debate has reached an impasse char-
acterized by a clashing of intuitions, chapter 4 will argue that the failure of 
trained philosophers to elicit converging intuitions about a circumscribed 
subject might indicate a deeper problem. The chapter will explore under-
lying sources of the opposing intuitions, argue that “cognition” may be a 
special kind of prototype concept, and yet oppose eliminating the concept 
from scientific taxonomy in favor of several less inclusive labels. Rather, 
there is perhaps an opportunity here to explore the possibility of a kind 
of pluralism that is familiar from mature sciences and that neither implies 
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antirealism nor impedes scientific progress. The attempt is in part moti-
vated by a suspicion that no single account of cognition is both broad and 
specific enough to account for the wide variety of cognitive processes. The 
broad range of interdisciplinary goals pursued in cognitive scientific inquiry 
and the complex nature of cognition and mind should render us suspicious 
of the idea that a single, unified framework will eventually explain the 
entire range of cognitive processes. Importantly, it is possible to embrace 
pluralism while still holding onto the effort to integrate relatively dissimilar 
positions into loosely knit frameworks. Clarity on such matters may help 
avoid confusion about whether novel approaches complement traditional 
cognitive science or provide an alternative to it.
Unlike the approaches discussed in chapter 4, chapter 5 will engage 
influential accounts of causal and constitutive relevance, aspiring to secure 
a more neutral base. The chapter will draw on an interventionist account of 
causal relevance (M) as defended by James Woodward (2003, 2010, 2015). 
It will add to M further conditions of stability and specificity to elucidate 
the particular relationship of nature-dependence and active scaffolding 
holding between the relata in ASC. The addition of these auxiliary condi-
tions will lead to the manipulability account of active scaffolding, or Active 
Scaffolding (M). M, thus enhanced, will capture many active scaffolding 
relationships; others are often characterized by mutual and bidirectional 
difference- making. This compels considering a metaphysically distinct con-
stitutive relationship, as investigated by the mutual manipulability account 
(MM) of constitutive relevance (Craver 2007). Recent work on mechanistic 
explanation (Bechtel 2017; Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007; Machamer, Darden, 
and Craver 2000) will help rethink relations of dependence that ASC aims 
to capture and provide a mutual manipulability account of active scaffold-
ing, or Active Scaffolding (MM). 
On a first pass, the chapter will use MM to explicate constitution as a 
difference- making relation, and it will deploy two of its conditions as a test 
for ASC. MM offers three advantages. First, it provides an independently 
motivated basis for specifying ASC, which avoids certain risks that chapter 
4 will identify. Second, it dovetails with the general pragmatic ambitions of 
this book, which seeks to explore the possibilities for extending the range of 
therapeutic interventions. Third, it retains proximity to explanatory prac-
tices in the relevant scientific fields and offers considerations on amenabil-
ity to experimental testing and confirmation. To avert the risk of importing 
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some difficulties linked to the notion of intervention, the slightly revised 
MM* will be introduced, which relaxes some requirements on interventions.
The second task (chapters 6– 8) is to show that ASC is a productive frame-
work for considerations about a number of characteristic features in mental 
disorders. The focus will be on problems with altered bodily experience and 
social cognition deficits, which are characteristic of a wide range of mental 
disorders, and the task will be to apply and adjust various conceptual and 
theoretical resources of ASC. Embarking on such a project seems attractive 
in light of the numerous potential benefits for diagnosis and treatment. 
First, understanding how scaffolded processes can disintegrate at many dif-
ferent junctures and at many different developmental stages, with each 
combination leading to markedly different downstream consequences, may 
assist in comprehending heterogeneous behavioral symptomatology. Sec-
ond, in light of the relatively modest efficacy of current treatment options, 
it is reasonable to explore scaffolding structures that perhaps eventually can 
be exploited for therapeutic purposes, complementing pharmaceutical and 
psychological interventions.
Embarking on such an enterprise, chapter 6 will offer an application 
of the idea that certain concepts and cognitive activities are, in various 
ways, scaffolded onto the sensorimotor system. More precisely, it will 
explore intrasomatic scaffolding and distinguish two ways to comprehend 
the scaffolding relationship that are consistent with the epistemological 
inseparability thesis. The chapter offers support for the ASC framework 
and analyzes several studies to provide a more comprehensive under-
standing of mechanisms that are involved in the symptomatology of 
depression— in particular, motor retardation. This work is accompanied by 
reflections on potential therapeutic implications and considerations about 
the kind of further research that would be needed for a systematic clinical 
application.
Chapter 7 will expand the scope of inquiry and address a particular form 
of intersomatic scaffolding, which not only involves the agent’s sensorimo-
tor apparatus but also extends into the environment to include external 
structures that adaptively guide behavior. In such cases, the vehicles of cog-
nition appear to individuate externally, constituting a neural, bodily, and 
extrabodily assembly. The chapter will trace the development of interac-
tive skills that enable behavioral synchrony, which sometimes drives cog-
nitive processes in children and adults. The focus will be on dysfunctional 
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emotion regulation in depression. Emotion regulation has a genuine cogni-
tive function and serves as the basis of an “extended” regulation of emo-
tional and physiological arousal. Improving our comprehension of this 
issue has important implications for theory and practice, and interactional 
synchrony might be a promising operational construct for studying diag-
nostic and therapeutic opportunities.
Chapter 8 will focus on pathological alterations in the skills that enable 
us to smoothly understand each other in various contexts. It will be shown 
that mindreading skills are supported by an epistemically engineered envi-
ronment and scaffolded onto the human body and sensorimotor appara-
tus. But in that case, one might anticipate new avenues for understanding 
common problems with social cognition in mental disorders. Research in 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD), for instance, has largely disregarded the 
role of the body and movement and described social cognition impair-
ments exclusively in terms of mindreading deficits. The chapter will aim 
to incorporate recent empirical work in light of the conceptual distinctions 
established in the first part of the book and will show how an analysis in 
terms of scaffoldings offers new perspectives on central features in ASD. 
Consistent with the epistemological inseparability thesis, the chapter will 
support the view that an adequate explanation of social cognition in ASD 
needs to consider possible sensorimotor impairments and their effect on 
disintegration in the higher- order functions that they assist.
Overall, the second part of the book aims to establish that shifting atten-
tion from mental symptoms to fine- grained sensorimotor aspects and fur-
ther improving the position proposed in the book can lead to identifying 
diagnostic subtypes, or even to specific sensorimotor markers for early diag-
nosis. One great advantage of identifying such markers is that they lend 
themselves to noninvasive, objective measurement that is relatively inde-
pendent of cognitive- linguistic abilities. After summing up what we have 
covered in the book, the conclusion will end by noting potential contribu-
tions to recent discussions on reduction in psychiatry.
In several ways, this book attempts to walk a thin line. It primarily 
appeals to philosophers, especially those focusing on empirically informed 
areas of philosophy of mind and (meta)theoretical issues, but also to men-
tal health professionals interested in current reflection on the theoretical 
basis of the scientific study of the mind. The relatively pluralistic position 
might help readers from the latter group explore the discussion without 
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requiring substantial prior commitments, but one could also worry that 
it results in a less sharp theoretical position than other contributors have 
adopted. However, the reasons for adopting this position are mainly the-
oretical. Although the ASC framework holds that explanatory purposes 
require adopting a taxonomy of various forms of active scaffolding, the 
choice of not endorsing a single, monolithic theoretical framework is sup-
ported by considerations about metaphysical disputes about the boundar-
ies of cognition, as well as debates on pluralism in other fields. To be clear, 
ASC is not neutral— for instance, it denies cognitivist assumptions about 
separability— and it is not pluralist in the sense that it grants equal status 
to the entire range of theoretical approaches. Instead, the overall outlook 
on cognition is pluralist in the sense of granting cognitivism a place in 
the larger story about cognition while remaining skeptical of the view that 
there is a single theoretical framework that can adequately deal with the 
entire range of cognitive processes.
The book also walks a thin line when it comes to the relationship 
between the ASC framework and the empirical material discussed in the 
second part of the book. As a note of caution, it should be stressed that 
there sometimes will be a disconnect between the relative precision of the 
definition of manipulability in the framework of ASC and the empirical 
material explored in this book. Because the empirical material on this sub-
ject is relatively sparse, at least compared to other areas of psychology, clini-
cal psychology, and psychiatry, some compromises are difficult to avoid. 
In some cases, perhaps somewhat imprudently, active scaffolding will be 
inferred from complementary but separate studies. Moreover, some of the 
findings mentioned, especially in the course of the last three chapters, are 
relevant for the overall goals of the book but have not been probed by a 
sufficient number of bottom- up and top- down interventions. 
